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ABSTRACT 6 
The UK’s 100,000 Genomes Project has the aim of sequencing 100,000 genomes from 7 
National Health Service patients such that whole genome sequencing becomes routine 8 
clinical practice. It also has a research-focused goal to provide data for scientific discovery. 9 
Genomics England is the limited company established by the Department of Health to 10 
deliver the project. As an innovative scientific/clinical venture it is interesting to consider 11 
how Genomics England positions itself in relation to public engagement activities. We set 12 
out to explore how individuals working at, or associated with Genomics England, enacted 13 
public engagement in practice. Our findings show that individuals offered a narrative in 14 
which public engagement performed more than one function. On one side public 15 
engagement was seen as ‘good practice’. On the other, public engagement was presented as 16 
core to the project’s success – needed to encourage involvement and ultimately 17 
recruitment. We discuss the implications of this in this paper. 18 
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INTRODUCTION 22 
In 2009, and as part of the long political push to implement genomics into healthcare, the 23 
UK House of Lords Science and Technology Committee called for the development of a 24 
‘strategic vision for genomic medicine in the UK’.1 In response, the Conservative government 25 
established the Human Genomics Strategy Group designed to monitor advances in 26 
genomics and develop a vision for the discipline within the NHS. The committee’s January 27 
2012 report explained the various steps needed to streamline genomics within the NHS 28 
and as such laid the foundations of the UK 100,000 Genomes project (Human Genomics 29 
Strategy Group, 2012: 9). In December 2012, the 100,000 Genomes Project was launched 30 
with the advertised aim of sequencing 100,000 genomes of NHS patients, focusing on rare 31 
disease, cancer and infectious disease. Its central goal was to implement genomics 32 
innovation/testing on a national scale such that it becomes routine in NHS practice. 33 
Alongside this, it also had a research-focused goal to provide data for scientific discovery, 34 
making it the first ever research-clinical hybrid project within a national health service.2 The 35 
project received over £200 million in initial investment (Monitor Deloitte, 2015) and 36 
gained specific support from the UK Prime Minister David Cameron whose eldest son had 37 
been born with a genetic condition (Summers and Sparrow, 2009).   38 
1 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldsctech/107/10711.htm 
2 Other research-hybrid projects not on a national scale include, for example, the United States Geisinger 
health systems’ MyCode® genomics data system and biobank, and the United States Mayo Clinic’s Center for 
Individualized Medicine. The research-hybrid set-up is interesting in terms of novel conceptions of 
innovation pathways and is the subject of a forthcoming paper (Dheensa and Samuel) 
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Genomics England is the limited company wholly owned by the Department of Health 40 
tasked with carrying out the rare disease and cancer arm of the 100,000 Genomes Project. 41 
In describing its remit the company states four central aims: to bring benefit to patients; to 42 
create an ethical and transparent programme based on consent; to enable new scientific 43 
discovery and medical insights; to kick-start the development of a UK genomics industry.3 44 
Thus, whilst the project was born out of a desire to bring patient benefit, to improve NHS 45 
infrastructure, and to drive research in the genetics arena, as with many biotechnologies it 46 
was also ‘justified in terms of [its] potential to generate economic value’ and as such exemplifies the 47 
‘bioeconomy’ at play (Petersen and Krisjansen, 2015: 30). Economic opportunities are 48 
anticipated from services required for DNA sequencing, data analysis and clinical 49 
interpretation. Investment is anticipated in areas of analytics, data management and ethics 50 
training (Monitor Deloitte, 2015). The 100,000 Genomes project is therefore much more 51 
than a DNA sequencing project, and although clearly embedded within the NHS its impact 52 
and influence stretch far beyond, and many different stakeholders will be involved in its 53 
activities.  54 
55 
At the same time as the advancement of genomic medicine was being pursued, policy 56 
makers and health care providers were becoming increasingly aware of the need for public 57 
3 https://www.genomicsengland.co.uk/about-genomics-england/ 
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engagement around matters of science and medicine (Stilgoe et al., 2014). In light of a 58 
growing academic literature (Secko et al., 2008; Burchell et al., 2009; O'Doherty and 59 
Burgess, 2009; Etchegary et al., 2015) universities and other research organisations were 60 
also becoming increasingly convinced of the need to engage with the public, in part to 61 
evidence the public value of their work as required by the research impact agenda (Martin, 62 
2011; Owen et al., 2016). As an innovative scientific/clinical venture involving partnership 63 
between politicians, policy makers, patients, clinicians, scientists and commercial 64 
companies it is interesting to consider how Genomics England positioned itself in relation 65 
to this increasingly important activity. 66 
67 
The influential National Co-ordinating Centre for Public Engagement defines public 68 
engagement as ‘the myriad of ways in which the activity and benefits of higher education and research can 69 
be shared with the public’ (National Co-ordinating Centre for Public Engagement). Pivotal to 70 
public engagement strategies is a two-way dialogue between specialists and the public so 71 
that specialists can listen to the public, develop their understanding of their views, and 72 
incorporate those views within their practices (Higher Education Funding Council for 73 
England, 2006; Select Committee on Science and Technology, 2000). However, debate still 74 
continues in terms of identifying what does and does not qualify as public engagement and 75 
the exact approach taken by any particular organisation will depend on their brief and 76 
target audience (Pieczka and Escobar, 2013). Avard and colleagues note, ‘there is confusion 77 
about what is meant by public involvement, as it can have many different meanings along a continuum that 78 
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ranges from low levels of communication to higher levels of involvement’ (Avard et al., 2010: 511). Allen 79 
and colleagues also note there is ‘confusion as to how public engagement should occur, the appropriate 80 
degree of involvement, the goals that involvement should seek to achieve, whom “the public” includes, what 81 
methods of involvement should be used, and how the success and utility of involvement should be assessed’ 82 
(Allen et al., 2014: 13). This is not surprising given the United States National Academy of 83 
Science’s recent 2016 report Communicating Science Effectively, which notes that science 84 
communication is complex, context and audience specific (National Academies of 85 
Sciences, 2016). 86 
87 
In contrast, Piectza argues that it is sometimes difficult to avoid a ‘one-size fits all’ 88 
approach to public engagement which risks it being seen as a means for achieving all 89 
institutional goals, especially in organisations which have a number of different remits all of 90 
which somehow relate to the public. Public engagement then becomes ‘a technology to educate 91 
publics, legitimize investments, improve public relations, manage risk, and deal with the media’ (Pieczka 92 
and Escobar, 2013: 121). For example, in a recent study, van Bekkum and colleagues 93 
identified a variety of ways in which 10 UK-based non-commercial funding bodies either 94 
partially or exclusively funding health or medical research, and explicitly promoting public 95 
engagement, interpreted and implemented their role to promote public engagement. Here, 96 
notions of public engagement were being interplayed with those of science communication 97 
and selling/promotion (van Bekkum et al., 2016)  98 
99 
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It would therefore appear that many public engagement initiatives borrow from the 
traditional, influential though largely discredited deficit model of public understanding of 
science in which, rather than ‘engaging’, the task at hand is to educate a deficient public in 
order to (hopefully) build trust in science. Indeed many institutions and cultural practices 
have been shown to still implicitly embody, or reinvent, notions of the deficit model within 
their public interaction activities (Brunk, 2006; Wynne, 2006).  
Against this backdrop we set out to explore how individuals working at, or associated with 
Genomics England approached their public engagement responsibilities. This work was 
conducted as part of a speculative study of the ethical issues arising for those working on 
the 100,00 Genomes project with a view to proposing a larger study which will now be 
taking place under the aegis of a large collaborative award.  
In terms of policy, Genomics England is publicly committed to notions of public 
engagement: ‘transparency’ is one of the organisation’s four central aims, and a statement 
of their approach to public engagement appears on the Genomics England’s website: ‘[we 
are] working with patients, patient groups and charities, patient and public involvement (PPI) groups and 
participants throughout Genomics England and the 100,000 Genomes Project. We also have a 
programme of public events and debates’. However, it is well established that policymaking can be 
distinct from what happens at the level of practice (Greenhalgh, 2004; Peters, 2013), and, 
as we have shown above, this is likely compounded for public engagement initiatives - 
especially 
120 
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constitutes public engagement, and the therefore blurred boundaries that may exist 
between the need to engage with the public, versus the need for other modes of 
communication such as those related to promotion. We have called this distinction the 
theory-practice gap in relation to public engagement.  
We wished to explore the theory-practice gap in Genomics England’s public engagement 
strategy. Both the literature, as well as Genomics England’s policy commitment do not 
reflect on such a gap, but rather assume a clear role for public engagement such that its 
practice is protected from any association with ethically fraught issues such as recruitment, 
information provision or consent in a research setting. We set out to empirically 
investigate what was happening in practice and therefore contribute to the growing 
literature on the theory-practice gap in public engagement. Initial findings of our study 
were encouraging, highlighting an active engagement strategy within the company and 
demonstrating an acknowledgment of the heterogeneity and complexity of different 
populations within public and patient communities. Alongside this, however, there was 
also a clear understanding of the organisational need to garner public and patient support 
for the project in order to drive recruitment, and thus ensure the project’s success 
clinically, scientifically and politically. This meant that people offered a narrative in which 
public engagement performed more than one function, and in which the possibility of 
conflicting goals for public engagement were apparent - although this was not always 
explicitly 
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recognised. On the one hand public engagement was seen as ‘good practice’, providing 
information about genomics and the 100,000 Genomes Project and creating a two-way 
dialogue in which Genomics England listened to and collaborated with patients and the 
public about their concerns with the project. On the other hand public engagement was 
presented as core to the project’s success - building public commitment to the project by 
encouraging involvement and ultimately recruitment. This was sometimes, though not 
always, seen to perform a function similar to traditional practices around the public 
understanding of science. These findings point to a theory-practice gap in public 
engagement, and our findings contribute to this literature. We discuss the findings in more 
detail below. 
METHODS  
As a medical ethicist and a medical sociologist working in the field of ethics, we were 
particularly interested in exploring how the ethical issues associated with the 100,000 
Genomes Project have been, and are being, addressed. Second author, Bobbie Farsides 
(BF), is an unpaid member of Genomics England’s Ethics Advisory Committee (EAC), 
which was established to ensure that Genomics England’s strategy and policy decisions 
were subject to independent ethical scrutiny; and as such, has a high level of understanding 
of the machinery behind the 100,000 Genomes Project and the ethical governance 
structures in place (Samuel and Farsides, forthcoming). Her experience and knowledge of 
Genomics England played a role in conducting this speculative study and also allowed first 162 
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author, Gabrielle Samuel (GS), to identify a number of on-going issues pertinent to her 163 
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interviews with members of the organisation. During these interviews, whilst many ethical 
issues were discussed, interviewees also spoke at length about Genomics England’s public 
engagement strategy. It is this aspect of the interviews which is reported here.   
Whilst BF is affiliated with the EAC, she has a long history of researching the practice of 
healthcare professionals and scientists working in ethically challenging fields, and has 
worked for many years with GS on the UK Wellcome Trust funded LABTEC project, 
which explored such practices. During this time, both BF and GS have reflected upon 
their ability to work closely with those they research whilst at the same time remaining 
independent in their research and analysis. 
Recruitment 
In order to contact those working at or associated with Genomics England, we sought 
permission from Board Member and EAC Chair, Professor Mike Parker, who BF was 
acquainted with, given her role on the EAC. After viewing and sharing the project’s 
proposed rationale and methodology with Genomics England, Mike granted permission 
for the project to proceed. First author, GS, spoke with Head of Ethics, Laura Riley, about 
who it would be best to interview to ensure a full range of opinions, stakeholders and 
institutions were garnered about the 100,000 Genomes Project and Genomics England. 
Laura Riley had access to names and email addresses of the relevant individuals who 183 
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forwarded to us.  Whilst this could be described as a convenience sample, all major actors 
in this small organisation were represented by interview (see below) and by the completion 
of the interviews data saturation had been reached. 
Neither Mike Parker, Laura Riley, nor Genomics England more broadly, had any 
knowledge of who responded to the recruitment emails (and hence who participated in 
the project). They also had no input into the project design, interview questions which 
were asked, nor the analysis of findings. 
Potential respondents were recruited in the summer of 2016, at the approximate half way 
mark through the 100,000 Genomes Project. Invites requesting participation in the 
research study, including participant information sheets, were emailed to 37 individuals 
associated with, or those who worked for Genomics England. Individuals from the 
following categories were invited: Genomics England staff members (including those 
involved in public engagement); Genomics England board members; Ethics Advisory 
Committee members; representatives from the Department of Health, Public Health 200 
England, NHS England, Genomics Medicine Centres (GMCs);4 and those involved in the 201 
4 There are 13 NHS GMCs each of which are centres of genomics excellence.  They are responsible for 
delivering the genomes project in terms of patient recruitment and consent; and DNA collection, extraction, 
and transport for sequencing. 
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evaluation of the 100,000 Genomes Project. Individuals were requested to respond to the 202 
email invite if they were interested in participating in the research project, or if they had any 203 
questions. A maximum of two follow up emails were sent to non-responding individuals.  204 
205 
Interviews 206 
20 individuals responded to the email invite and 20 semi-structured interviews were 207 
conducted. All of the categories of individuals listed in the above section were represented 208 
in the interviews (exact numbers are not provided to protect confidentiality). All 209 
participants signed a consent form prior to the interviews commencing. Interviews were 210 
conducted either by telephone or face-to-face (at a location chosen by the participant), 211 
lasted between 30 and 105 minutes, and were recorded. The interview schedule was broad, 212 
asking participants about their background and their role associated with the 100,000 213 
Genomes Project. Participants were also asked their views on the project; on its benefits 214 
(present and potential) and drawbacks; on any issues they had come across in relation to 215 
their role in the project and how these had been overcome; and on the project’s ethics and 216 
public engagement strategy. Interviews were transcribed either by GS or by an external 217 
transcribing service.  218 
219 
Analysis 220 
Analysis of interview data was approached using inductive reasoning employing the 221 
inductive approach of grounded theory (Strauss, 1987; Charmaz, 2006). The analysis (or 222 
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coding) of data was based on two inter-linked rounds: overview analysis and detailed 223 
analysis (Strauss, 1987). Overview analysis consisted of memo-making and broad coding. 224 
Extensive memo-making was employed by the interviewer directly after each interview. 225 
Broad coding proceeded by scanning the interview transcripts for relevant ideas and 226 
themes. Detailed analysis of the full transcripts occurred line-by-line using NVivo software. 227 
Coding was carried out via constant comparison, which was continual, rigorous and 228 
allowed for developing and refining of conceptual categories as theory was developed. Due 229 
to the limited number of individuals associated with Genomics England, and the need to 230 
protect confidentiality population, comparisons between respondents from different 231 
institutions are not reported.  232 
233 
FINDINGS  234 
Interviewees provided a wide variety of examples of public engagement strategies 235 
implemented by Genomics England. These included meetings in town halls and other 236 
settings aimed to gauge the publics’ attitude to genomics; focus groups which explored 237 
(potential) participant’s views on the project; the establishment of patient and participant 238 
panels within the NHS; collaborative events with, for example, Cancer Research UK and 239 
the UK’s Wellcome Trust; and commissioning public engagement type exercises to start a 240 
public conversation about genomics and explore public understanding and public 241 
perceptions of issues around the project. The Genomics England website was also viewed 242 
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as a useful platform for explaining and providing information about the 100,000 Genomes 243 
Project. 244 
245 
At the heart of all of these strategies were notions of public engagement which aligned 246 
closely with those reported in the academic literature (National Co-ordinating Centre for 247 
Public Engagement). Genomics England representatives expressed a genuine desire to 248 
listen to the public and patients, pay attention to their views, and concomitantly alter their 249 
approach in light of these views (‘all our decisions were influenced by feedback we got from the 250 
research that was done’ (interviewee 17)). Interviewees provided examples to explain this. For 251 
instance, one interviewee described how, in response to public concerns, original plans to 252 
store genomic information in a ‘cloud’ had been scrapped in place of a more physical 253 
storage facility: ‘to give you a really strong piece of evidence of how we listen to people, at the outset of the 254 
project they gave us a strong steer that they didn’t want their data in a cloud run by companies like 255 
Amazon or Google. So we have a fixed data centre’ (interviewee 16). In a second example, 256 
Genomics England had made the decision to invite a number of project participants to join 257 
the Genomics England data access committee – a committee which controls access to the 258 
data and samples collected within the project be that by academic researchers, clinicians or 259 
industry partners. In this way they responded to concerns expressed by participants 260 
regarding access to their genomic data.  261 
262 
The access review committee is chaired by a scientist and there are two or three scientists on it. But 263 
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there’s also four lay people on it. And these are…representatives of participants, the idea being that 264 
if you’re enrolled in the program, you should be sitting there when people request for access to data 265 
saying, “actually I enrolled in this program and I’d actually like these people to be working on this 266 
data.” Or “Actually, I’m not sure I like what they’re proposing; perhaps they can look at it and 267 
come back to us with a better proposal.” Or “Indeed, this is on your list of unacceptable uses and I 268 
don’t want my data used this way.” So we’ve put them at the heart of the decision-making process 269 
in terms of access to the data (interviewee 16) 270 
271 
Openness and transparency were seen as a crucial component of Genomics England’s public 272 
engagement strategy (‘what was required was an ‘honest[y] about stuff’ (interviewee 14)). 273 
Interviewees offered various reasons for why they perceived openness and transparency to 274 
be so important. For some, transparency was an intrinsic ethical responsibility, ‘we’re very 275 
transparent about what will happen to data. We're very transparent about storing the data..[..]..that’s 276 
ethically responsible’ (interviewee 16). This was important because the project was ‘working with 277 
public money’: ‘I don’t think working with public money…we should do things that we need to hide…it’s 278 
a principle underpinning everything I do’ (interviewee 4). For others transparency seemed to be 279 
crucial because of more extrinsic reasons such as supporting patient recruitment.5 Some felt 280 
5 We note that the opinions of those whom placed intrinsic importance in openness/transparency most likely 
stem from a social constructed backdrop of society becoming more open and transparent in order to build 
trust between experts and the ‘public’ (as Moore notes, ‘a deficit in scientific understanding is being replaced by talk of 
a deficit in trust…the trust deficit is to be remedied by openness, consultation and dialogue with the public’ Moore A. (2010) 
Public bioethics and public engagement: the politics of "proper talk". Public Underst Sci 19: 197-211. As such 
the intrinsic and extrinsic views of openness and transparency are blurred, since, as we show below the need 
to recruit patients also relates to the perceived need of gaining public trust. Nonetheless, the two separate 
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that public engagement was the best way to counter misleading and/or potentially damaging 281 
ideas about the organization, with interviewees worried about the ‘danger [that] you can have a 282 
perfectly ethical project but it's portrayed in a way to patients, that they misunderstand what's happening’ 283 
(interviewee 7). Interviewees were concerned that public and patient misunderstanding 284 
would in turn influence recruitment of patients to the project: ‘there’s some things which we realised 285 
we had to explain to the public because without which we couldn’t do the project’ (interviewee 17). As 286 
such, participants spoke about the need to ‘monitor perceptions’ (‘you should monitor it 287 
[interactions with the private sector] extremely carefully and in terms of public perception’ (interviewee 6)) 288 
and ‘earn [the] trust’ of the public by moving slowly towards more controversial issues. So 289 
for example, recognizing that the public had concerns about allowing commercial companies 290 
to access genomic data Genomics England postponed any major announcements on the 291 
matter until they felt that they had earned trust by demonstrating openness and transparency: 292 
‘it is acknowledged that commercial use of data is controversial and so we have to earn the trust by showing 293 
you what isn‘t involved’ (interviewee 13). 294 
295 
Such narratives highlight the beginnings of the two parallel and potentially conflicting 296 
accounts of pubic engagement which we discussed in the introduction to the paper. In one 297 
instance openness and transparency is narrated as intrinsically important to any public 298 
perspectives were apparent in interviewee’s narratives, and at the very least represent differences in priorities - 
one trying to adhere to the intrinsic importance of openness (even if such principles are situated/constructed) 
and the other focused on the need to recruit patients.   
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engagement strategy working with public money, and in the other instance openness and 299 
transparency are viewed as an extrinsic means to ensure the project’s successful recruitment 300 
of patients.  301 
302 
Public support as a route to success  303 
Similar to the duel effect accounts of openness and transparency described above, two 304 
differing narratives also emerged in interviewee’s accounts about the purpose of public 305 
engagement more broadly - as both an intrinsically good practice, and as a practice with the 306 
goal of ensuring patient recruitment.  307 
308 
On the one hand, public engagement was perceived as good practice (‘involvement of patients 309 
and the public…is good practice’ (interviewee 11), and as an intrinsic ethical good which gave 310 
space to the public to learn and debate:  311 
312 
Public engagement is inherently an ethical enterprise in two ways. One is that science is public….I 313 
think science is a democratic enterprise and people have a right to know what’s going on and a right 314 
to debate what, how and why….The other level is that …some of us would say ethics is exactly the 315 
public conversation about what it is that we are trying to achieve and why and who has a say and 316 
developing ethical principles can only be done successfully through the building of a public consensus 317 
about what they ought to be and what they should say (interviewee 13) 318 
319 
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On the other hand, interviewees’ viewed public engagement as a means of fulfilling an 320 
extrinsic goal. This goal was the generation of essential public support to ensure the success 321 
of the 100,000 Genomes Project (‘you need the engagement of the people…it’s going to be most successful 322 
if people understand about it’ (interviewee 11); ‘if you don’t have the support of the public, then really the 323 
project - it is one of those things that could bring this project down’ (interviewee 12)). In referring to 324 
‘success’, interviewees were talking about the need to recruit patients (‘if the public lose confidence 325 
in the probity of the venture, then they will refuse to participate’ (interviewee 10)). Therefore, as was 326 
discussed in relation to openness and transparency, the public engagement strategy became 327 
a mode with which recruitment could be achieved: ‘I think it’s just a case of educating, supporting 328 
and getting people on side and…then they’ll be asking questions [if they are not invited to participate in the 329 
project]. “Well, hang on I’ve got this, why am I not being asked if I want to be part of this 100,000 Genome 330 
Project” (interviewee 11).  331 
332 
Only one interviewee felt that since the genomes project only related to a subset of patients, 333 
public engagement at the general population level had little relevance in terms of patient 334 
recruitment. This interviewee ‘doubt[ed] that having a general debate now is really going to be the way 335 
to encourage people to give genomics data at the point at which they get their cancer diagnosis’ (interviewee 336 
19). Though interviewee 5 noted that a public engagement strategy directed to those ‘publics’ 337 
working within the NHS could ensure the success of the genomes project, along with levels 338 
of recruitment: ‘I think it's that support all the way down - from the consultant that somebody might see 339 
in the hospital - the nurse, the receptionist, everyone is going to have a positive vibe about this to get it going’ 340 
18 
(interviewee 5). 341 
342 
Tensions between intrinsic and extrinsic notions of public engagement 343 
Our data suggests that the need for public support and the need for patient recruitment was 344 
so vital to Genomics England, that public engagement strategies aiming to fulfill this purpose 345 
often overshadowed the notion of public engagement as being an intrinsically good practice 346 
directed solely at encouraging public debate and increase public understanding. Interviewee’s 347 
narratives provided examples of how Genomics England’s approaches to public engagement 348 
often emerged from a strategic need for the project to succeed rather than from an intrinsic 349 
desire to implement good practice. Furthermore actions taken on the basis of public 350 
consultation and engagement such as the aforementioned decision to change the approach 351 
to storing data in a ‘cloud’ was viewed as an effort by Genomics England to maintain public 352 
trust and support. There was an awareness that instigating an ethical public engagement 353 
approach, was necessary not only as a goal within itself, but also to ensure public confidence. 354 
355 
I think by bending over backwards to have public trust at the center of our objectives [is] the right 356 
decision for sure. The ways in which we have limited access to the data make it harder to get hold of 357 
it; it makes it more difficult for researchers and definitely more difficult for industry. So, all of those 358 
compromises, [are] the things that we have accepted in order to sustain trust (interviewee 17) 359 
360 
Interviewees’ narratives which drew on ‘ethics’ and ‘good practice’ as an intrinsic rationale 361 
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for engaging with the public often reverted to this need for public support (‘it’s important that 362 
we’re not just ethical but that we’re seen to be ethical as well to provide public confidence…I think that that 363 
is a necessity of what we need for public engagement’ (interviewee 2). One can see the importance of 364 
public support to Genomics England as a brand in other decisions that were taken for and 365 
by the organisation. For example the decision to situate its main activity within the NHS 366 
which is seen as a trustworthy institution (Hazelton and Petch, 2015): ‘in some ways having too 367 
strong a Government interest in this is not necessarily a good thing. So they're keeping the brand genomics 368 
England slightly separate…And also keeping it, like I say, aligned to the NHS brand’.  369 
370 
By allowing public engagement to have the dual role as a means to gain public support meant 371 
that the lines between informing and encouraging debate on the one hand, and engaging 372 
people for recruitment purposes on the other hand, sometimes became blurred. There 373 
sometimes seemed to be a fine line between the notion of ‘selling’ the project to generate 374 
engagement and support, and of ‘overselling’ the project both of which might overshadow 375 
the more objective desire to inform and engage as more traditionally understood. 376 
Interviewee’s narratives diverged in terms of their own personal perspectives on the balance 377 
between telling, selling and overselling. All interviewees talked about the genomics project 378 
‘being sold to the public’ and as being ‘sellable’ (‘at the moment it’s been sold to the public….’ 379 
(interviewee 9); ‘probably what is sellable is the fact that..it will improve their health care’ (interviewee 380 
2). There was no problem inherent in selling a project which they all felt was valuable, well 381 
conceived and necessary within the context of a 21st century health service (‘the project is a 382 
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really good decision’ (interviewee 18). However, whilst most did not view this selling as 383 
overselling (‘we mustn’t oversell this project…and I think that's pretty much done’ (interviewee 5); ‘there 384 
hasn’t been a major big campaign’ (interviewee 19)), other interviewees were less convinced, 385 
noting a tendency for Genomics England to overpromise the project’s benefits: ‘I do wonder 386 
whether at times it was oversold and over promised’ (interviewee 8); ‘I think they’re a bit over on the hype’ 387 
(interviewee 9). Indeed interviewee 16 when asked about engagement spoke about elements 388 
of a PR campaign showcasing Genomics England’s success stories: ‘they’ve made videos. When 389 
we ask them would they allow us to show pictures of them when we present, they say absolutely; we want 390 
people to see us because we want others to know that there is hope for them to get answers from the programme’. 391 
392 
The blurred boundaries between engaging, selling and overselling did not go unnoticed by 393 
interviewees, some of whom felt Genomics England’s engagement strategy sometimes lent 394 
too much towards the goal of building a ‘climate of acceptance’ to drive recruitment. For 395 
example, in the extract below, interviewee 13 is criticising those individuals at Genomics 396 
England who view public engagement in terms of the old fashioned public understanding 397 
of science model, and as a mode to garner support from the public: 398 
399 
Some people think it’s [public engagement] purely about building a climate of acceptance. That it’s 400 
about reassuring people that this is useful, that the details are complex but they’re basically sound 401 
and please let us get on with it. Some people are wedded to the more old fashioned public 402 
understanding of science model (interviewee 13) 403 
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This view i.e., that public engagement is about presenting information about genomics in 
the ‘right’ way to gain support for recruitment, was corroborated by interviewee 18: ‘[some of 
the strategies imply that] if you present stuff to people in the right way, it will convert them’. Similarly, 
interviewee 2 took the view that trying to ‘persuade’ the public of the importance of the 
genomes project was problematic as a goal of the public engagement strategy: ‘I do sometimes 
worry that we want to try and persuade the whole population that this is a good thing, whereas actually we 
shouldn’t be doing that’.  
DISCUSSION 
Our findings have highlighted a theory-practice gap in public engagement and the 
potentially conflicting roles that emerged within Genomics England’s public engagement 
strategy. On the one hand, interviewees narrated an account which respects public 
engagement as being intrinsically important, and as being ‘good practice’ in terms of 
informing the public, and allowing the public to raise any potential concerns about the 
project and then make their own decisions on the basis of the understanding generated by 
an ‘objective’ presentation of the ‘facts’. On the other hand, there was recognition of the 
substantial extrinsic value to public engagement in terms of generating public support, and 
ultimately encouraging recruitment to the project. Moreover, our interviewees provided a 
range of examples in which the clinical (and political need) to demonstrate movement 
towards the publicly stated goal of mapping 100,000 genomes meant the need to actively 424 
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generate public support over shadowed much of the public engagement agenda. At some 425 
level this issue is further complicated by the interesting hybrid identity of the 100,000 426 
Genome project as a clinical and research endeavour. When considering the project as a 427 
clinical entity it is relatively unproblematic to think of Genomics England alerting cancer 428 
and rare disease patients to the opportunity of engaging with a new level of care, 429 
accentuating the possibility of this contributing to their pursuit of a diagnosis and/or 430 
effective treatment. However, when seen as a research project, recruitment to the 100,000 431 
Genome Project should ideally take place against a background of researcher equipoise 432 
(Freedman, 1987). That is, at the level of public engagement, potential participants should 433 
be given a clear sense of the newness, uncertainty, and lack of existing knowledge about the 434 
project, and how the choice to participate will benefit the patient in terms of their clinical 435 
experience.6 We would argue that the need to own and negotiate this potential conflict is 436 
the key responsibility of Genomics England when conceiving and implementing their 437 
public engagement strategy. This is not a unique challenge, with similar examples having 438 
been reported previously (Pieczka and Escobar, 2013; van Bekkum et al., 2016).  439 
440 
In terms of Genomics England, we would also argue that it is unrealistic and possibly even 441 
inappropriate to expect the organisation to keep the momentum going on a more 442 
generalised and potentially critical debate on the value or otherwise of genomic medicine. 443 
6 Here we are not suggesting this does not occur at the level of patient consultation. Just that for research 
projects, it is ordinarily part of any public engagement strategy.  
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An earlier phase of public engagement in which Genomics England was not necessarily 444 
directly involved, had already promoted public debate around the value of genomic 445 
medicine, noted the objective goods of the project, and generated enough support for 446 
politicians to push the project forward.7 Thus Genomics England was able to move 447 
forward on the basis that the initial goals of public engagement had been achieved and the 448 
need for them to have a discussion with the public about the value of the 100,000 449 
Genomes Project was no longer required. This is not to say that Genomics England 450 
ignored or deflected the issues that might have arisen in such a debate, just that it was not 451 
seen as core business to continue ‘discussion for discussion’s sake’, their response was one 452 
of problem solving and practical mitigation of concerns. Genomics England was therefore 453 
able to start its public engagement strategy from a position where their mission already had 454 
political and expert professional support and endorsement, and was perceived to have 455 
social value. It would be naïve to assume that support or indeed knowledge of the project 456 
was widespread within the professional groups which would ultimately be involved in its 457 
research. But the preceding debate and level of acceptance at the highest levels gave moral 458 
permission for interviewees’ to commence their engagements with wider professional 459 
groups and the public with the underlying assumption that the genomes project was a good 460 
idea and had social worth.  461 
7 We are not arguing the value or worth of the 100,000 Genomes Project here, since this is beyond the 
premise of the paper. Rather, we are illustrating how political endorsement gave the project a perceived 
worth. 
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462 
The purpose of engagement then became informing, and listening to, the public against an 463 
already positive backdrop to fine tune and ultimately introduce the programme of research 464 
and clinical intervention. This aligned with the extrinsic purpose of public engagement to 465 
‘sell’ the benefits of the project and gain public support for recruitment. As such 466 
interviewees were convinced that pursuing both goals of public engagement gave their 467 
strategy both intrinsic (in terms of listening to the public and helping them navigate the 468 
project’s complex associated issues) and extrinsic (in terms of generating support and 469 
ultimate recruitment) social worth and were therefore morally permissible.  470 
471 
Whilst interviewees seemed convinced of the moral permissibility of the public engagement 472 
strategies employed by Genomics England, it is important to acknowledge the difficult 473 
tensions that were inevitably produced between ‘selling’ the project, and trying not to ‘over 474 
sell’. We argue that Genomics England must remain vigilant about ensuring any strategies 475 
to increase public support, do not amount to over-selling the programme to those who 476 
might be recruited as participants now or in the future thereby respecting the need for 477 
balance and equipoise. The danger is that if an appropriate balance cannot be reached 478 
between selling and over-selling, managing expectations and supporting rational decision-479 
making in clinical practice will become a serious ethical and practical issue. Consideration 480 
of this issue can be informed by recent work in other areas of medicine. For example, in 481 
the field of brain stimulation for children and young people with movement disorders, 482 
25 
483 
484 
485 
486 
487 
488 
489 
490 
491 
492 
493 
494 
495 
496 
497 
498 
499 
500 
501 
502 
hopeful patients and their families often arrive at clinics with highly optimistic and hyped 
visions of what the brain stimulation technology can deliver. Such visions are fuelled from 
promotion material within the media, often disseminated by clinicians themselves as they 
endeavour to promote their research and its benefits (Brown and Michael, 2003).  Within 
the clinic, health professionals must then manage patient expectations by deploying less-
optimistic, uncertain and modest visions of the technology and the patient’s future 
(Gardner et al., 2015). A more positive example is possibly the soon to be attempted 
mitochondrial transfer procedure where the introduction of a cutting edge procedure has 
been preceded by a long running and nuanced public debate which has allowed clinicians 
and potential patients to manage and recalibrate their expectations in line with scientific 
evaluation.  
Managing the expectations attached to the 100,000 Genomes Project are further 
complicated by the blurred boundaries created by the project’s dual research-clinical hybrid 
nature. Such blurred boundaries might make it difficult for patients/families to understand 
the project’s purpose and rationale fully, and if expectations are over-sold (especially the 
clinical benefit aspect of the project compared to its research aspect), patients/families 
might expect some immediate clinical benefit, such as an effective treatment, especially 
because sequencing was performed as part of a clinical service, on NHS premises, by NHS 
staff, and sometimes following other clinical tests (Dheensa et al, forthcoming). We have 
discussed this issue at length elsewhere, where we suggest that managing such expectations 503 
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(as well as other issues concerns related to the research-clinical hybrid nature of the 504 
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project), would best be negotiated by re-conceptualising the distinction between research 
and clinical practice (Dheensa et al, forthcoming). 
For Genomics England it is important to acknowledge the relatively low levels of public 
understanding about the 100,000 Genome Project which will unfold within the NHS. 
Whilst it will remain an important element of their work to engage with and recruit the 
professionals who will need to be on board to deliver the service and conduct the research, 
if their public engagement strategy moves too far towards over-selling to this group, it may 
in turn lead to heighted patient and public expectations about the clinical benefits of the 
genomes project. These expectations about the project then place pressure on clinicians, 
who need to manage them at the level of clinical practice.  
Looking forward, it is crucial that those charged with ‘selling’ the genomic agenda need to 
do so in a manner that permits potential participants to understand the balance of costs 
and benefits, weigh them appropriately and manage their expectations appropriately as they 
embark upon their journey as a patient/participant in a complex and innovative 
intervention. This needs to be done in a setting which allows open space within which 
dialogue between Genomics England and potential patients/patients is nurtured and 
encouraged; a way in which Genomics England acts in a non-authoritarian manner in spite 
of the need to drive recruitment; and in a way which allows ‘trust’ to permeate the 524 
27 
525 
526 
527 
528 
529 
530 
531 
532 
533 
534 
535 
relationship (Bowman, 2017). As such, in terms of recommendations we simply draw 
attention to the possibility of a conflict of interest and ask that Genomics England be 
mindful of this, and of the generic nature of public engagement versus the more specific 
engagement required to attract people to participate in research. Such recommendations 
are especially important as we move further towards the UK Chief Medical Officer’s 
Generation Genome – a vision to bring genomics into all aspects of NHS care – and a 
venture that will require a strong public engagement strategy which recognises and remains 
vigilant of the theory-practice gap in public engagement initiatives as it proceeds forward 
to the intersection of research and clinical care (Davies, 2017).  
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